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Introduction  
Frequently museums are entreated to transfer cultural heritage objects from their 
collections to the objects’ ‘rightful owners’;1 these will usually be individuals, communities 
or nations who lost possession of the objects during wartime or colonial oppression, or who 
were the victims of looting. Many museums, now in possession of these objects, may have 
acquired them in good faith many years ago. The effect of limitation periods may mean that 
in legal terms the museum has good title2 since the original owner’s title has been 
extinguished.3 However, it is clear that in museum practice, evident in its professional 
ethical norms, that there is a shift from reliance on traditional conceptions of ownership to 
a more ethical sense of guardianship which takes account of third party claims and seeks to 
ensure that museums have an ethical entitlement to objects. In circumstances where the 
museum has clear legal title claims made by original owners or the originators of the objects 
would necessarily need to be made on moral grounds. Campfens describes such objects as 
being ‘tainted by the existence of some moral right operating in favour of the former 
owners’ and as representing a grey area.4  It is these grey areas that provide the context in 
which the discussions in this paper take place. This paper offers a theoretical approach to 
moral claims which relies on the concept of title to property, albeit a moral title. It thus 
shifts the focus away from the more generalised concept of ‘rightful owners’. Moral title, 
which it is argued, is separate from legal title and which would have no legal force in itself, 5 
would come about where there is a strong moral claim to the object which has been 
identified based on objective criteria. The resultant moral title would lead to the 
recommendation of one of a number of different remedies. In this way, rather than focusing 
on ownership which suggests that the object is necessarily transferred to the claimant, 
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instead, a moral title may give rise to a lesser entitlement than the transfer of legal title, 
such as the right to have an account of the object’s history displayed next to an object which 
is retained by a museum. The on-going nature of moral title may be useful to ensure that 
museums which retain previously contested cultural objects follow the terms of the 
recommendation. It is argued that one can interpret various ethical norms and the 
recommendations of certain alternative dispute resolution panels as recognising in practice 
an underlying moral entitlement enjoyed by claimants.  Therefore the methodology used is 
an interpretative analysis6 of the way in which claims based on moral grounds are 
approached and resolved in the context of the Nazi dispossessions of cultural objects, 
specifically the work of the UK Spoliation Advisory Panel (the Panel)7 and the ethical norms 
found in museum codes of ethics.8 Moral title, is not though a subjective concept, but 
results from the response made to claimants who, Campfens opines, have ‘legitimate 
expectations that are based, not on any individual idea of morality, but rather on ethical 
codes and other soft law norms, supported by examples of previous restitutions’.9 The Panel 
recommendations provide such a body of restitution decisions and provide scope for 
developing practices and theoretical concepts to apply to other types of claim for cultural 
objects.  
This paper provides a contribution to the debate on the way in which to frame claims to 
cultural objects based on the moral strength of the claim rather than providing a fully 
formed and finalised concept. It is acknowledged that moral title could come into existence 
at a number of different points in time. This paper will explore the different options and 
offer a suggested solution. This paper therefore puts forward a framework for the future 
development of mechanisms for resolving claims to cultural objects and more specifically to 
provide the firm foundation of an underlying principle of moral title that can encourage the 
resolution of disputes on a consistent and coherent basis.10 
The approach taken here is from an English common law perspective and the focus is on the 
way in which museums in England deal with claims to contested objects held by them in 
their collections.11 It is acknowledged that the development of moral title may also be 
evident in the work of the other European Panels established to hear Nazi Era claims. 
However, the primary focus will be on the decisions of the Panel which illustrates a limited 
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notion of responding to moral claims based on the moral strength of the claimant’s case and 
any moral obligation on the museum in possession of the cultural object at issue.  
The first section will analyse the existing legal context in which claims to cultural objects 
may be made. The discussion will then focus on the different types of claims based on moral 
grounds that may be made to museums and the similarities between them which may 
justify a moral response to them. The third part will then focus on the recognition of these 
claims in ethical norms and then set out the concept  of moral title to claims and how this 
may be evident both in ethical norms found in museum codes of ethics and also specifically 
in the context of Nazi Era dispossessions and the work of the Panel.  
A preliminary comment about title 
Legal entitlement to objects will necessarily frame the discussions where the current 
possessor’s entitlement to the object would otherwise be upheld by a court of law. 
However, in many claims involving cultural objects legal title will no longer be enjoyed by 
the claimant. Whilst the argument is not being put forward that moral title has any legal 
force, nevertheless, it has been recognised that much utility can be derived from analogies 
with legal principles,12 albeit with a caveat of not adopting an overly legalistic approach. The 
concept of moral title as set out in this paper is a theoretical framework within which to 
view claims, the approach to the concept of title does derive support from the approach 
taken in English common law.  
Whilst there is some academic debate about the precise meaning of ‘title’ in English law, 
particularly in the context of the sale of goods,13 there is strong support for treating the 
term as measuring ‘the strength of the interest [a person] enjoys [over an asset] in relation 
to others’.14 This term can also be used as shorthand for ‘the claimant’s right, or 
entitlement, to possess the thing.’15 For the purposes of this paper the term ‘title’ shall be 
used to refer to the strength of someone’s interest in an object which gives them an 
entitlement to that property. ‘Legal title’ shall be used to refer to the strength of the 
interest and a claimant’s entitlement that would be recognised by a court of law. ‘Moral 
title’ shall be used to refer to the strength of the interest that would be recognised by a 
government-backed independent panel of experts such as the Spoliation Advisory Panel. In 
the case of moral title, this entitlement will not necessarily be to possession of the object, 
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facilitated through a transfer of legal title, but may amount to a lesser entitlement. This 
feature will be explored below.  
The legal position of claims and museums’ title to cultural objects  
Over the years a museum will have acquired a vast number of different objects, from a wide 
range of sources and in a variety of different circumstances. Where it can be established 
that the object was recently removed from the original owner’s possession without their 
consent then it is likely that a claimant could establish the existence of a cause of action in 
the tort of conversion (wrongful interference with goods). Since possession is the 
cornerstone of one’s rights to personal property a previous owner would bring a claim in 
conversion based on his immediate right to possess the goods,16 rather than because he 
may be described as being the owner per se. This reflects the principle that there is no 
absolute right of ownership that can by itself be vindicated in court and that the English 
common law of personal property relies heavily on the concept of relativity of title.17 
Because title is relative, it can be resolved by a court in favour of one party, even though 
someone else, who is not a party to court action, may have a superior claim. 18 
Where there has been a conversion the claimant would be entitled to receive 
compensation, although under section 3(3)(b) of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 
1977 the court has a discretion whether or not to order the delivery of an object under 
section 3(2)(a). Case law shows that return of the object tends to be limited to 
circumstances where damages are an inadequate remedy.19 Cultural objects that might be 
considered as being unique or having an intrinsic value, thus rendering damages an 
inadequate remedy, would usually justify return.20 If we consider three examples of claims 
made for recently acquired objects it will be possible to see that in some situations as well 
as civil liability towards the claimants, there may be additional criminal liability for the 
acquiring museum. First, consider a cuneiform tablet originating from Iraq that was 
purchased by a London-based museum in 2011. It has now become apparent that this tablet 
was illegally removed from an Iraqi museum during the Gulf War and that the seller was in 
full knowledge of the facts of its wrongful removal. Here, the Iraqi museum would have an 
extant claim in the tort of conversion since the 6-year limitation period would only start to 
run from the first purchase unrelated to the theft (here the purchase by the London 
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museum, assuming it was made in good faith).21 However, the museum may be guilty of an 
offence under the Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2003 of dealing or failing to 
transfer the object to a constable, unless it can show it “did not know and had no reason to 
suppose that the item in question was illegally removed Iraqi cultural property."22 Similar 
co-existing civil and criminal liability can also be seen in the context of a fixture taken from a 
listed building. The second example, involves a sculpture which formed an integral part of 
the architectural design of a listed building and which was sufficiently annexed to the land 
and was illegally removed23 in 2014 and later sold to a museum. If the removal was made by 
someone other than the owner of the listed building then the owner would have a claim in 
the tort of conversion. Whether or not it was the owner of the listed building, or an 
unauthorised individual who sold the sculpture to the museum, there is a risk that both 
seller and buyer would be guilty of an offence under the Dealing in Cultural Objects 
(Offences) Act 2003 unless it could be established that they were not dishonest and that 
they did not know or believe that the object was tainted.24 Similarly, if an object from illegal 
metal detecting activity on a scheduled monument were sold to a museum there is again a 
risk of criminal sanction under the 2003 Act. 
These two pieces of legislation, which form part of criminal law regime, demonstrate the 
recognition that there is a need to respect cultural heritage of particular states that might 
be at risk during times of war, but also the associative value of heritage that a heritage 
object may have with its archaeological or historical context.  
However, where an object was taken from its place of origin years earlier and has been in 
the UK for many years there may be no direct legal impediment to acquiring this object 
because the current possessor would have the best title to the object and this could be 
passed on to the acquiring museum. This is because the statute of limitation would not only 
have barred the claimant’s claim, but would also have extinguished the original owner’s 
title. Where an object had been stolen before May 1981, under the Limitation Act 1939,  the 
six year limitation period started to run from the original conversion, not from the first good 
faith purchase (which is now the position under the Limitation Act 1980).25  It is clear that 
both Limitation Acts have an effect beyond a purely procedural one which would only bar a 
claim, but instead they alter who the holder of title to the object is.26 Therefore, unlike the 
general position with regards to limitation periods, in the context of the tort of conversion 
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the effect of the Limitation Acts 1939 and 1980, is to bar the right as well as the remedy.27  
So far, there has been no successful claim that the extinction of title to cultural objects in 
this way is contrary to human rights legislation. In the case of land even though the 
extinction of title after a period of time necessarily affects the property rights of an 
individual, and may take effect without the payment of compensation, the Grand Chamber 
of the European Court of Human Rights (reversing the decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights) held that limitation periods pursue a legitimate aim in the general interest28 
and that the application of limitation periods in the context of adverse possession to land 
did not upset the “fair balance” under Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.29 There is ECtHR jurisprudence which acknowledges the 
importance of protecting cultural heritage as a legitimate aim which may justify interfering 
with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions30 as well as an emerging recognition of cultural 
identity.31  However, this has not been applied directly, either in the ECtHR or in English 
courts, to claims for cultural objects from museums. 32 Therefore, by itself, it seems that at 
present there is little on which to base such a legal claim.  
A more frequent situation will arise where museums, many years earlier, acquired objects 
for their collections and by now the Limitation Act 1939 will have extinguished the original 
owner’s title 6 years from the date of the conversion. This can be seen in several categories 
of claims. First, those claims involving dispossessions during the Nazi Era as a result of Nazi 
persecution. Despite the original act of dispossession being wrongful and most likely 
amounting to an act  of conversion, title would, in legal terms, still have been extinguished 
six years after entering into the UK. Secondly, the 1970 UNESCO Convention was only 
ratified by the UK in 2002 and has no retrospective effect. Consequently, illicitly exported or 
stolen cultural heritage post-1970 but before 2002 may be found in museums, but no claim 
could be made for its recovery due to the extinction of the original owner’s title. Such 
objects might include elements of historical monuments, antiquities which are more than 
100 years old or archaeological objects from excavations.33 Thirdly, claims for human 
remains may be made, but there is no legal obligation to return these, not least because it is 
questionable whether any legal title in them existed in the first place.34 Fourthly, indigenous 
communities may have been dispossessed of objects which were taken to be housed in 
museum collections, but for which they did not give permission for removal. In these 
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situations the claimant communities will often have a continuing relationship with the 
objects which may well form part of a cultural practice. Finally, an object in a museum may 
have been acquired by wrongful taking during times of war, but many years earlier than 
1970. Examples might include the Benin Bronzes and the Maqdala treasure now housed in 
the British Museum.  
The first four of these categories are what Campfens has called the grey areas where moral 
claims are necessitated because of the lack of a legal claim. 35 It is to the question of how 
moral claims arise and to the common issues relating to the different categories of these 
moral claims that the discussion now turns.  
How moral claims emerge 
“Disputes about who has good title – who is the legal owner – must be 
distinguished from disputes about who has the best moral right to the 
item in question. Claims are often made against museums and galleries, 
in this country and elsewhere, for the return of objects, where the claim 
is not (or not mainly) based on legal ownership, but on moral 
considerations.”36 
Any claim for an object where legal title has been lost would necessarily need to rest on an 
extra-legal claim since the current possessor museum would otherwise be entitled to the 
object based on its better title. It is argued that claims will necessarily be based on moral 
reasons as to why it is more appropriate that the claimant either have possession of the 
object, or have some entitlement to be consulted or involved in the decision-making process 
about the curation of the object. It is argued that this claim to an entitlement would then 
have a strength which would be recognised as moral title to the object.  Gillman suggests 
that where a possessor has good title (i.e. legal title) then any claim made for the return of a 
cultural object would necessarily take a moral rather than legal form such that the claimant 
would frame it in terms that he ‘has a greater moral right to the property than the present 
individual or corporate owner, their claim should be enforceable through political channels 
or at international law’.37 It is acknowledged in legal scholarship that there are moral rights 
which “exist independently of any legal system”, but which are shown to exist “by moral 
argument”.38 They are “capable of being deduced from the nature and experience of 
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ourselves, and the world and society in which we live. Rational people can recognize such 
rights independently of their being given force of law.”39 It is argued that in the context of 
cultural objects such moral rights have been reasoned by the arguments made in favour of 
facilitating the resolution of claims. These have arisen in the contexts discussed in the 
previous sections and will be more fully analysed below. It is argued that where a moral 
right exists, there is also “a moral right against the wrongdoer that he will correct the wrong 
he has done.”40  In the context of cultural objects now in museums one problem is that the 
wrongdoer may not now be the person against whom any moral claim can be made, but 
instead it will be the museum which now possesses the object against whom a claim (more 
usually for transfer) will made. In such circumstances, whilst the museum may have 
benefited from the original wrong, it did not cause it and the claimant will usually not be 
original owner, but may be an heir or a descendant of the originating community, but who 
can show a continuity of belief, customs or religion. In these circumstances, though, it may 
be more accurate to talk of claims, rather than rights.41 Frequently the term ‘rights’ is used 
to denote a claim that a person may make against another but ‘claim’ is appropriate 
phraseology for the situations that arise in the context of cultural objects since statements 
of entitlement will be couched in terms of claims which may be given effect to, rather than 
absolute rights.  
There are two ways in which one could analyse these moral claims. The first is that these are 
historical claims which have survived the years based on the original owner’s loss of 
property. The basis on which these claims are made is arguably a type of historical 
entitlement42 which has at is basis the moral circumstances. This could be based on the 
circumstances of the dispossession, which may have taken place as part of the commission 
of a crime against humanity.43 Alternatively, these could be analysed as situations where the 
remedy is focused on the claimants who require acknowledgment of the wrong that befell 
their forefathers and that this acts as part of the reconciliatory justice.44 Thompson treats 
claims for family heirlooms as a situation where the later generations have the claim to the 
object and the importance of the object to the family means that the claim preserves down 
the generations.45 This would cover the situation where claims are made for the return of 
cultural objects that were owned by Jewish families but which were taken during the Nazi 
Era. The importance of recovering these objects may pass down the generations such that 
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their recovery now takes on a symbolic value.46 However, where the circumstances of loss 
took place in the context of breaches of human rights or crimes against humanity then there 
may be an ongoing obligation which is not based on a historical claim, but which has 
continued to the present day. In this regard, Vrdoljak suggests that indigenous claims are 
not just about historic injustices, but are about continuing violations of human rights or 
‘violation of their right to self-determination’.47   
Gillman identifies three bases on which moral claims to cultural objects outside the legal 
system may be grounded: ‘remedying historical inequity’; ‘the overall utility [being] greater 
in one place than another’; or ‘a collective right to the property’.48 Nazi Era dispossessions 
would fall into the first of these categories as would objects or human remains that were 
taken during colonial times from indigenous originating communities. Claims from such 
communities would also fall  into Gillman’s third category. Wrongful taking of cultural 
objects may well fall into all three categories (whether before or after the 1970 UNESCO 
convention came into force).   
Whilst these claims arise in a variety of different situations, there are commonalities in the 
way in which they arise and in the way in which they can be resolved. One common feature 
of certain types of moral claims that has found widespread public support and which have 
been justified on the basis of moral reasoning is where the circumstances of loss involved 
genocide, crimes against humanity or some other breach of human rights and therefore 
acceding to claims is a means of remedying the historical inequity as Gillman would describe 
it. This can be seen in the context of Nazi Era dispossessions which have been treated as sui 
generis, because of the scale49 but  were recognised because of ‘methodical and systematic 
manner’ of dispossession as it was directed at specific people,50 which was not just for the 
Nazis’ self-enrichment but also ‘formed an integral part of their attack on other races’.51 
Cotler has described these widespread dispossessions as thefticide.52 This close link with 
genocide and crimes against humanity has therefore been a justification for the differential 
approach53 and the keenness to facilitate return of Nazi Era dispossessions. The similarities 
with genocide and the past infringement of human rights has also been seen as justification 
for the restitution of Aboriginal human remains.54 However, as Scovazzi points out,  
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‘there may be other instances [than those connected with genocide] where the 
acquisition of items of cultural property, however legal on its face, does not comply 
with fundamental moral requirements’.55 
These fundamental moral entitlements might arise from the circumstances of dispossession 
which may fall short of genocide, but would nevertheless be considered morally 
questionable.56 They include claims made by states to cultural objects that they treat as 
emblems of their cultural heritage. Some objects of cultural importance may have been lost 
by communities or nations during times of unequal power relations or as a result of war or 
colonial dispossessions; prime examples of this are found in the British Museum in the cases 
of the Benin Bronzes and the Maqdala Treasure (the latter having been described by a 
Parliamentary Select Committee as being one of the clearest examples of when a museum 
should give effect to a moral claim.57 Where the circumstances of dispossession are morally 
questionable then this may lend strength to a moral claim, so too might the actions of the 
museum when they initially acquired the object; the provenance research undertaken by 
the museum may have fallen short of the standard that would have been expected at the 
time. UNESCO, through its Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of 
Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in case of Illicit Appropriation 
and the ICOM-WIPO Art and Cultural Heritage Mediation initiative, shows a strong 
international commitment to such claims and the need for return. 
Strong parallels have been highlighted between Nazi Era claims and those for indigenous 
cultural objects in terms of the contexts of removal, the discourse about the objects, return 
being a form of redress as well as the importance of the assertion of control.58 However, 
similarities can also be drawn with other acts of dispossession. For example the removal of 
objects from the City of Benin in 1897. There is a similarity of the context of removal, 
although in a shorter period of time than in the case of Nazi Era and colonial dispossessions. 
The discourse concerning the objects and return as a form of redress and the importance of 
control hold similarities across these different objects. This can be seen by the importance 
attributed to the recent return of certain Bronzes to the Oba of Benin by a private individual 
whose grandfather acquired them during the post-conflict looting.59 It is therefore argued 
that similar moral claims could be justified on these bases. 
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Facilitating moral claims through legal mechanisms  
National museum collections60 are protected in legal terms by governing statutes such that 
the museums are only permitted to transfer objects from their collections in the most 
limited of circumstances.61 This is predicated on the basis that these collections are retained 
for the public benefit and should remain intact for future generations. The limited 
circumstances in which transfer can take place tend to be where objects are duplicates, 
consist of printed material that can easily be reproduced or where the objects are 
decaying.62 It has been confirmed by the High Court that this prohibition could not even be 
side-stepped where there was a strong moral argument for transferring an object to a 
claimant based on the morally questionable circumstances in which the original owner lost 
possession of the object.63 However, Parliament has enacted two significant exceptions to 
this general rule which now permit transfers in circumstances where there is no legal right to 
have an object transferred to a claimant, but where there is arguably a moral argument in 
favour of this. The first, relates to human remains and permits the transfer of human 
remains of people who died less than 1,000 years before the Act came into force out of their 
collections ‘if it appears to them to be appropriate to do so for any reason’.64 This change to 
the law came about because of the recommendations of the Working Group on Human 
Remains65 and the strong political support from the UK and Australian Prime Ministers.66 The 
second exception concerns the transfer of cultural objects of which the original owner were 
dispossessed during the Nazi Era. Here, under the Holocaust (Return of Cultural Objects) Act 
2009, national museums have the power to transfer objects to claimants where this course 
of action has been recommended by the Panel and then approved by the Secretary of 
State.67  
Both of these relaxations of the general legal presumption against transfers from national 
museum collections were brought about by a realisation that there were legitimate non-
legal claims based on moral grounds which might be made by original owners or originating 
communities. Neither statute prescribes automatically acceding to claims, but instead 
provide facilitatory mechanisms for responding to claims in appropriate circumstances. 
Museums established as charities are also under restrictions about when they can transfer 
objects from the collections, but this would include circumstances where they felt under a 
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moral obligation to give an object to a claimant, such as a situation where the object had 
been taken during the Nazi Era.68 An example of this is the Courtauld Institute which, 
following the recommendation of the Panel in the Feldmann claim, transferred objects from 
its collections to the claimants with permission of the Charity Commission.69  
Contrastingly, local authority museums which are not set up as charities will tend to be 
under no legal prohibition on transferring objects from their collections. Nevertheless, they 
would be under the general ethical obligation against disposal from museums found in 
museum codes of ethics and which applies to all types of museum, regardless of legal 
structure. These are discussed below in the context of ethical norms. 
Recognition of moral claims in ethical instruments  
Through a variety of ethical norms found in museum codes of ethics and associated 
guidance there is an increasing recognition of a pre-existing and persistent entitlement on 
moral grounds. Museums shift themselves away from reliance on traditional legal concepts 
of title to a more ethical notion of title to cultural objects. Not only can this be seen in the 
way in which museums act as ethical guardians,70 but also through their focus on ensuring, 
when they acquire objects, that they obtain valid title to them.71 Furthermore, in the 
context of existing collections, we can see that museums recognise that their strict legal 
entitlement might need to give way to a moral one, for museums are entreated to be 
cognisant of potential claims for restitution or repatriation of objects from within their 
existing collections. 72 
This section analyses the way in which both the framework of ethical norms derived from 
professional codes of ethics and other guidance recognise the validity of third party claims 
to cultural objects that are held by museums. Where museums seek to acquire objects there 
will be incumbent on them Each of these is analysed below. First, when acquiring objects for 
their collection, museums should ensure that the objects are not tainted by any potential 
legal or moral claims. Secondly, in the context of their existing collections (i.e. historically 
acquired objects) museums need to be alert to potential third-party claims which may again 
be made on either legal or moral grounds.  
Acquisition of objects  
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Above it was seen that in many situations there may be no legal bar to a museum acquiring 
an object that was converted many years earlier, because of the expiration of the original 
owner’s title under the statute of limitation. However, the ethical norms by which museums 
conduct themselves (and which often tend to exceed the legal obligations) would encourage 
against such an acquisition if the original owner or originating community or state might be 
thought to have a claim based on moral grounds. This can be seen in both the international 
and national museum codes of ethics and it is clear that they apply to the grey areas 
identified by Campfens.73 First, this can be seen through ICOM’s concept of valid title74 
which aims at ensuring that objects are free from taint.75 Such taint may result from the fact 
that the original owner of the object was dispossessed of it without permission, for example 
by theft or a sale that was forced because of duress, or in general circumstances of 
persecution.76 Valid title is described as the ‘Indisputable right to ownership of property, 
supported by full provenance of the item since discovery or production’.77 This means that 
even if a museum could show that it had a defensible legal title to the object, acquired by 
virtue of statute of limitation, it would nevertheless need to show that it had made every 
effort to undertake the appropriate due diligence to establish a full ownership history.78 
Museums have effectively imposed on themselves obligations of good faith which in many 
situations will require them to undertake obligations in excess of their strict legal duties. The 
UK’s Museums Association Code of Ethics categorically states that there are certain 
circumstances where objects should be rejected. First, where there is a suspicion that the 
object has been stolen79 and secondly where there is any suspicion that it has been  
‘wrongfully taken during a  time of conflict’.80 In the situation where there is a suspicion that 
it has been stolen there is a proviso that the museum might be able to acquire it, if it had 
consulted the ‘rightful owner’ and the acquisition was aimed at bringing the object into the 
public domain.81 This provision therefore treats the original owner as being having a 
continued moral entitlement to be consulted about the appropriate treatment of the object.  
Museums are required to reject objects that have been illicitly traded where it is clear that 
this happened after 1970. Thus, although the UNESCO Convention 197082 did not enter into 
force until 1972, it appears to be treated as a date after which museums have an enhanced 
standard of due diligence; in effect, museums have been put on notice about the illicit trade 
by virtue of the international commitment to fighting against which was expressed in the 
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convention itself.83 The use of the date of 1970 reflects the way in which international legal 
instruments which show a commitment to ethical behaviour, but which may not have been 
adopted by a country, can influence the ethical treatment of cultural objects. Therefore, this 
date now acts as an ethical marker, after which point museums should be aware of the 
inappropriateness of acquiring objects which have been illicitly traded after this date.  
It seems that the museum profession recognises that there is a continued relationship 
between the object and the original owner (or the community from which the object 
originates), for in the MA’s Acquisition Guidance it states that museums, when acquiring 
objects for their permanent collection, should consider ‘The moral rights of individuals, 
groups, societies or peoples to hold the item’.84 It recognises, therefore, that others may 
have a claim to objects based on moral grounds, which should be taken into account before 
acquiring the legal title to objects.  
Existing collections  
The UK Museums Association (MA), in its Code of Ethics, entreaties museums to act as 
ethical guardians,85 holding their collections ‘in explicit or moral terms...in trust for the 
benefit of the public’;86 therefore the relationship between the museum and its collections 
is one of a guardian or steward caring for the collections, yet acting on behalf of the 
public.87  
Within the framework of ethical norms, there is a clear presumption in favour of the 
retention of museum collections and there are strong sentiments against disposals outside 
the public domain, particularly where these are financially motivated.88 The MA has even 
gone as far as engaging disciplinary procedures where museums have disposed of objects 
for purely financial motives and without fulfilling the justifications for such disposals.89 
Nevertheless, it is clear that within this context it is recognised that third party claims may 
be made for the transfer of cultural objects and that these should be dealt with in a 
sensitive manner.90 
It is clear that by virtue of their ethical codes, museums in possession of objects to which 
others may claim an entitlement on moral grounds are expected to initiate dialogues 
relating to these holdings.91 Restitution should happen where it is clear that an object was 
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exported or transferred in violation of laws such that museums should (if permitted by law) 
take ‘prompt and responsible steps to co-operate in its return’.92 
A risk of subjectivity?  
Concern has been expressed about the subjectivity of moral rights.93 However, in addition to 
the ethical norms found in museum codes of ethics, there are various other international 
commitments to such moral claims. Statements of international commitment as far back as 
1943 with the Inter-Allied Declaration and the more recent declarations such as the 
Washington Conference Principles and the subsequent statements of principles 
demonstrate a clear and widespread commitment to the existence of these rights in the 
context of Nazi Era possessions in a concrete form and which are not simply subjective but 
have developed as a consistent policy. Indeed, the Allies’ commitment to restitution was 
clear from the post-war restitution laws that were set up in Germany in the different 
military zones.94 International conventions such as the 1970 Convention have shown a deep-
rooted international commitment to the fight against the illicit trade in cultural objects and 
the recognition that some objects form an integral part of a nation’s heritage and the 
museum profession, in its professional codes of ethics, have followed the spirit of this and 
other international conventions in providing a higher moral obligation than the strict legal 
one. Claims made by one state against another on moral bases are clearly envisaged in the 
context of both UNESCO and WIPO, as discussed above.95 In the context of indigenous 
claims for human remains international commitments such as the Vermillion Accord,96 
together with domestic guidance such as the DCMS Guidance on Human Remains97 
demonstrates a firm commitment to the appropriateness of return of human remains. 
Furthermore, indigenous claims for other cultural objects are directly supported by the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.98  
The existence of these varied types of claims have common elements which link the moral 
bases on which claims may be brought which do not have resort to subjective 
considerations, but can be identified objectively. Whether a claim is upheld in principle will 
depend on the balancing up various considerations and the focus will now turn to such a 




The emerging concept of moral title  
The notion of the importance of moral as well as legal title to cultural objects was first 
raised in the context of auctions99 and has since developed in the field of museums.100 It is 
argued that one can interpret the work of the Panel as recognising the existence of an 
entitlement by claimant which is based on moral grounds, which might be called a moral 
title to the original object. This arises because the Panel has determined (based on its 
assessment of the overall legal, factual and moral situation, specifically (a) the moral 
strength of the claim, or (b) the moral obligation on the museum),101 that the claimant is 
entitled, based on moral grounds, to some remedy. This may be by recommending the 
return of the object, the payment of either an ex gratia payment or compensation, or the 
display of the account of the object’s history next to the object in the museum.102 It is 
argued that this moral title is now vested in the claimant, as heir to the original owner’s 
estate. This moral title may either have been inherited by the claimant from the original 
owner, or may have vested first of all in the claimant by virtue of the Panel’s 
recommendation. Moral title could therefore arise at various stages. Each of these is 
analysed below.   
Legal and moral title existing conterminously in the case of all personal property 
It is argued that there is a moral element to property entitlement such that in the event of 
any theft it could therefore be considered that the original owner is the ‘rightful owner’ in 
moral terms such that theft elicits ‘widespread disappropriation’.103  
Arguably a moral title to property exists regardless of whether the object is cultural heritage 
or something more fungible in nature in terms of one tends to think of the legal owner as 
morally entitled to his property.104 However, statutes of limitation clearly recognise that 
later possessors should, after a specified period of time be free from a claim by an earlier 
owner.105 It would seem therefore, that any moral title would be extinguished by the statute 
of limitation at the same time as the legal title. However, it might be argued that the 
position of cultural objects is different. This could be by virtue of their special status as 
having a value beyond their financial one.106 Yet, such an abstract value of the objects may 
not be sufficient by itself to provide justification a moral entitlement that would survive 
limitation periods, rather the value that might justify a continuing moral entitlement would 
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need to be the value to someone in particular. This might be shown if the object in question 
is a central part to a practice which may have a sacred significance to a community, or 
where the object is inextricably linked to the identity of the community or nation. 
Repatriation and restitution of cultural heritage objects has a powerful role to play and 
return can, through a process of re-socializing of objects, provide a means of ‘preserving and 
renewing the intangible aspects of heritage’107 and can lead to renewal of cultural values.108    
Morafl title only arises where the original legal title holder was dispossessed of a cultural 
object in morally repugnant circumstances.  
Alternatively moral title could be theorised as persisting and surviving any statutory 
extinction of the legal title as a direct result of the particular circumstances in which the 
original owner lost possession of the cultural heritage object. Here it would be the moral 
repugnancy of the loss that justifies the persistence of a moral title that survives the original 
owner’s legal title.  In the case of Nazi Era cultural objects the loss in the context of the 
genocide of particular groups has frequently been used as justification for the special 
treatment.109 Therefore, in the context of the Panel’s work involving dispossessions at the 
hands of the Nazis in the context of persecution of the Jews, we can see that such 
circumstances could act as the necessary factor that allows the moral title to survive the 
limitation periods. However, even within the work of the Panel, there is clear support for 
the extension of the necessary level of moral repugnancy to losses which have no link with 
genocide and yet the moral title was still established and justified return of the object. The 
Benevento Missal which became part of the British Library collection was, on the balance of 
probabilities removed (probably stolen) during the confusion of war in Italy, most likely 
when the Allies had requisitioned the building in which the manuscript was housed. In the 
Panel’s Report, more emphasis was placed on the circumstances in which the museum110 
acquired the manuscript; the museum’s provenance checks, even measured against the 
standards of the day, were found wanting. The curator should have enquired further when 
it became apparent that the manuscript was written in Beneventan script and was likely to 
have originated from Benevento. The Panel did not assess the cultural value of the object. 
No analysis was contained in the report about the moral strength per se of the claimant’s 
claim; instead, more focus was placed on the moral obligation on the museum resulting 
from the circumstances in which it acquired the manuscript. However, it is argued that the 
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Chapter House’s original ownership of the manuscript, together with the circumstances of 
loss were still sufficient to give the Chapter House a continuing moral entitlement to the 
manuscript, justifying its return.  
Such a title therefore arises, not when the original owner acquires the object, but on the 
occasion of his being dispossessed of it. This might be either when there was a direct seizure 
or within general context in which dispossession took place (the overall persecution of the 
Jews). The Panel expressed in strongly emphatic terms the fact that in the case of a seizure 
by the Gestapo of a collection of artworks, the claimant’s had a strong moral claim.111  
Moral title only arises on the recommendation of the Panel 
An obvious point at which moral title could arise is when the Panel actually makes a 
recommendation that there is sufficient strength to the claimant’s moral claim or where it 
recognises that a moral obligation rests on the museum which justifies a remedy. On this 
analysis the Panel would either be creating a moral title at this point, or it could be said to 
crystallise on the recommendation by the Panel that a claim is sufficiently strong or the 
museum is a moral obligation such that a remedy is justified.  
Overview analysis of the proposals  
Whether or not the claimant’s entitlement derives from their forefathers (i.e. the original 
owner) and would therefore be based on an historical entitlement112 or their own 
entitlement in terms of historical injustices and reconciliatory justice113 nevertheless, by 
giving effect to moral claims or recognising that museums have a moral obligation to return 
the object to the claimant, the Panel is recognising a moral title that is enjoyed by the 
claimants in that the moral strength to their claim is sufficiently strong to justify a remedial 
response.   
In the first two propositions above, moral title would have needed to devolve to the original 
owner’s heirs. This therefore relies on it being capable of being inherited and sufficient to 
allow the claimant to frame a claim against the possessor-institution derived from his 
ancestor’s original legal title and concurrent moral title. A clear difficulty arises with this 
fiction in that the moral claim arguably only arose in 2000 upon the establishment of the 
Spoliation Advisory Panel. Alternatively moral title could be treated as being implied as early 
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as 1943 by the Inter-Allied Declaration114 when the state-parties reserved their positions to 
declare invalid transfers of property. However, doubts have been expressed about its 
current customary law status because of states’ overall non-compliance with its 
provisions.115   
A particular problem arises if one analyses the moral claim coming into existence on the 
formation of the Panel. This approach might be framed within the context of Thompson’s 
approach to treating the current claimants as having claims in their own right which are 
based on reconciliation rather than historical entitlement.116  In circumstances where the 
original owner had by that time died, then this claim would have originated with the 
claimant, rather than with his ancestor. This would mean that the claimant would be 
claiming in his own right, rather than as the descendant of the original owner. Here the 
moral claim and any resultant moral title might arguably be weaker than that of his ancestor 
since it is based on his own loss rather than the original owner’s. Under this analysis, if the 
Panel were to award an ex gratia payment it could be said that the award should be made 
on the basis of the loss of the chance of inheriting the object, rather than the loss of the 
actual object.117 However, treating the claimant’s loss as his own is inconsistent with the 
approach taken by the Panel so far in its recommendations where it tends to treat the 
claimant as stepping into the shoes of the original owner. This can be seen in the Tate 
Gallery/Griffier claim118 where the Panel assessed the strength of the original owner’s 
claim119 and then asked whether the claimant (her son) and other family members should be 
in any weaker position than she would have been were she still alive.120 Whilst the Panel’s 
main focus in answering this was whether the claimant’s earlier visits to the museum and 
lack of a formal claim at that time prejudiced the strength of their claim,121 the fact that that 
did not reduce the strength suggests that the claimant is treated in a manner which assumes 
that it is his ancestor actually making the claim. Claimants show their entitlement by a series 
of bequests made down the generations. The approach therefore seems to be that: had the 
original owner been alive then morality would dictate that the painting ought to be returned 
and therefore it ought to be returned to the heir. This moral entitlement does appear to be 
treated as being of a proprietary nature since it is something that is inherited.  
It seems more likely in practice though, that the moral entitlement crystallises, at the time 
that the Panel makes a recommendation based on its assessment of the strength of the 
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claim and whether any obligation rests on the possessor institution. Until then no 
entitlement has crystallised, but rather merely a claim exists.  
When the Panel makes a recommendation to return an object then that creates a moral 
entitlement that has been recognised by an independent body. It still remains for the 
institution to agree to that recommendation and to give effect to it through the transfer of 
the legal title to the claimants. It is therefore fragile in nature because it is not something 
that would be upheld by the courts. Nevertheless, it is clear that were a museum to refuse 
to follow a recommendation of the Panel then professional embarrassment is likely to 
ensure compliance with its terms.   
Ways in which to give effect to moral title 
If the person who enjoys good title therefore has a right to possession and we treat moral 
title in a similar vein to the person who has the best title to the cultural object, then it 
seems appropriate to suggest that a successful claimant, would be entitled to have the 
object transferred to him. In most cases, where the claimant has been successful the Panel 
has recommended that the museum should transfer the object to the claimant. Moral title 
could be said to merge with the legal title when the legal title is transferred and that would 
be the only title on which the claimant would need to rely in the future. This is similar to a 
situation where property is owned by an individual and there is a merging of both the legal 
and equitable title (where it is unnecessary to talk about the two as separately occurring), 
rather than where property is co-owned where it is necessary to separate the legal and 
equitable interests.  
Where the Panel recommends the payment of an ex gratia sum and that the object remains 
in the museum, were this to be accepted by the claimants in full and final settlement of the 
claim122 then the claimant’s moral title would surely cease to exist.123  
The remedy of the display of an account of the object’s history, as well as being 
recommended in conjunction with the payment of an ex gratia sum can also be 
recommended as a freestanding remedy. This approach has also been adopted by the Dutch 
and German panels. This has occurred even where the Panel made no accompanying 
recommendation of the payment of an ex gratia sum and consequently this 
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commemorative action has been the only remedial response despite there being a moral 
strength to the claim, albeit one that does not justify return. Appropriate situations include 
where the claimant’s had already been compensated or where the forced sale was not at a 
significant undervalue.124 
Alternatively, the Panel may have recommended that the museum retains the object but 
that it should display an account of the object’s history next to it. Here moral title would not 
entitle the holder to possession of the object, but rather to an entitlement regarding the 
manner in which the object is, in future, displayed. To this end, the use of the word ‘title’ 
may differs somewhat from the traditional legal concept of title which equates to the 
entitlement to possession. However, it could nevertheless still be described as the quantum 
of interests125 that the holder has, (albeit not an interest to possess, but something 
altogether different) and correspond with the approach that suggests that it possible to 
have title to a lesser interest in property.126 Potentially a museum may well overlook the 
need to display the account of the object’s history in the future and display it without the 
explanatory text. In such a case it would need to be considered If a claimant has accepted 
the Panel’s recommendation as full and final settlement of a claim and the museum failed to 
display the account then this failure could have the effect of allowing the claimant to revive 
his claim. Whilst in theory, a moral title could give the claimant the right of some form of 
redress, it would be difficult to quantify what this would be, for he would not have suffered 
any financial loss. A recommendation of the payment of a nominal sum would seem 
inappropriate here as the very nature of the original remedy was commemorative in nature 
and necessarily not loss-based. It might seem more appropriate then to require 
performance of the obligation itself since damages would be inadequate.127  Having said 
that one could envisage that in many situations, if the account were omitted then the 
museum would be willing to reinstate it without any further recourse to the Panel being 
necessary.  
Applications beyond Nazi Era claims 
Dispossessions at the hands of the Nazis have been treated in the UK as sui generis as 
discussed above. Yet, the Panel’s jurisdiction and the power granted to national museum 
governing bodies extend to any object taken during the Nazi era (defined as 1933-1945128) 
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and so the Panel ‘not without some hesitation’ accepted jurisdiction of a claim for the 
return of the Beneventan Missal129 even though it had no direct connection with the actions 
of the Nazis. As discussed above, it was most likely to have been removed during or after 
the Allied bombardment in 1943.130 Since this dispossession was not part of the systematic 
pillaging and physical and cultural persecution of the Jews by the Nazis, but was instead lost 
either as a result of theft or pillage, moral title appears to be capable of deriving from 
actions that fall short of genocide perpetrated on a particular group.131 The author has 
argued elsewhere that this claim provides support for the possibility of establishing moral 
title in claims brought by other groups since the determinations by the Panel are not based 
solely around the genocide or persecution suffered by the claimant group.132   
Furthermore, the Benevento Missal recommendation, is the only claim where the claimant 
was a legal rather than natural person and where the claimant was actually also the original 
owner (usually claims are made by heirs of the original owner). This feature of the claim 
lends further gives support to any argument which seeks to justify the extension of these 
principles of moral title to other claimants, such as communities or nations, rather than to 
specific, identified heirs.  As a concept then, moral title has the potential to extend beyond 
purely Holocaust-related dispossessions and to apply more widely to situations where 
claimants were dispossessed of objects and have a continuing connection with them, along 
the lines of the notion set out in the MA guidance discussed above.133  
Campfens suggests that ‘The question of whether any specific procedure can serve as an 
example for future models will, in the end, depend on the use, acceptance and authority of 
the solutions to deal with disputes as they emerge.’134 It is argued that the bases on which 
the Panel determines the moral strength of the claim and any moral obligation on the 
museum are starting to develop into objective principles that can be applied in subsequent 
moral claims.135 By focusing on moral title, rather than taking either restitution or 
identifying the ‘rightful owner’ as the starting the process permits the balancing of different 
factors to reach a solution that will respond with nuance to the moral circumstances. If the 
moral strength of the claim lends itself to return as a remedy then this is an available option. 
However, in a situation where the claimant or his descendant received financial 
recompense, either by receiving the market value of the object, or post-war compensation 
then alternative remedies can be considered instead.  
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To further develop the concept of moral title, it may be relevant to take into account the 
public benefit that is derived from a cultural object so that that can be weighed in the 
balance when considering how to give effect to moral title. It may be, that where there is 
little connection between the claimants and the original object, the public benefit derived 
from the object far outweighs the benefit of receiving the object, rather than money or 
some remedy. This approach can be seen in the Dutch case involving the Semmel claim 
where some objects were returned to the heirs, whereas others were retained by the 
museum since the interest of the museum in making those objects available to the public 
outweighed the emotional and moral interests of the claimants in having the objects 
returned to them.136 In this way, in circumstances where the value of the cultural heritage 
object may be more fully realised in the public domain, this is a factor that could be taken 
into account when determining the appropriate course of action to take. Further, the 
remedies which could be used to respond to the recognition of the claimant’s moral title 
could include collaborative ventures or other civil society solutions137 to cultural heritage 
disputes.  
Although in a Scottish, rather than English context (but where the differing legal systems 
does not affect the analogy), the approach taken to hearing moral claims can be seen in the 
procedure adopted by several institutions with a resultant moral title. The ‘influential 
model’138 of Glasgow City Council,139 commended by the Select Committee,140 looks at the 
following factors when deciding whether or not to transfer a requested object from its 
collection:   
1. ‘The status of those making the request... 
2. The continuity between the community which created the object/s and the current 
community on whose behalf the request is made. 
3. The cultural and religious importance of the object/s to the community. 
4. How the object/s have been acquired by the museum and their subsequent future 
use.  
5. The fate of the object/s if returned.’141 
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Rather than focusing on the circumstances of the loss of possession in establishing the 
strength of the claimant’s claim in Panel recommendations, here the moral strength of the 
claim is derived from the cultural and religious importance of the object to the claimant 
community. It also looks at the moral obligation on the museum derived from the 
circumstances in which the object was acquired by the museum. These factors, again take 
into account the moral aspects of the claim, and their application can be seen in the context 
of the successful claim for the Lakota Ghost Dance Shirt which was returned to the Lakota 
people in 1999. The return of shirt was described as “an exception to the general 
presumption against return because of its unique position in the history of the Lakota, 
because of the way the object found its way into Glasgow's collection, and because the 
delegation were able to meet the Council's concerns for the long term preservation of the 
object.”142 
Conclusion  
It has been argued that the concept of moral title to cultural objects has developed as a 
concept and can be derived from the decisions of the UK’s Spoliation Advisory Panel. Moral 
title provides a mechanism by which to recognise the particular strength of the moral claim 
and also the situations where there is a moral obligation on the institution regarding the 
object. Despite the difficulties in establishing exactly when the claimant’s moral title comes 
into existence there is a strong argument for saying that when the Panel recommends a 
remedy to give effect to a successful claim, which is then acted upon by the respondent, this 
crystallises the claimant’s (new or prior) moral title. This recognises that the claimant has an 
entitlement to have the physical object transferred to him, to receive some monetary 
recompense or to have the history surrounding the original owner’s dispossession of the 
object commemorated publicly.  
The concept of moral title provides a framework in which to classify those with an 
entitlement to cultural objects that may, in certain circumstances, take precedence over the 
legal title of the possessor institution. It also provides a means by which to frame the wider 
debate since it provides a more objective means by which to approach claims for cultural 
objects rather than using more subjective approaches such as talking of the ‘rightful’ or ‘true 
owners’ or by focusing solely on claims for restitution.  The Panel demonstrates a situation 
25 
 
where an independent body which has government backing recognises an entitlement to 
cultural objects that is based on one of the grey areas identified by Campfens’ and where 
the strength of that interest (the title) on moral grounds may be recognised. In some 
instances the strength of this interest means that the moral title will trump that of the legal 
owner and justify the return of the object to the original owner. However, this will not 
always be the case. A moral entitlement may well be recognised, but its strength, whilst 
strong enough to be categorised as such is insufficient to justify trumping the legal title.  
Moral title avoids the focus being on ‘rightful owners’ or restitution. By starting from these 
points, the debate can become polarised if one starts with the view that one person is the 
‘rightful owner’, particularly in situations where the museum came into possession of the 
object innocently. Instead, a balancing exercise can be taken and a determination made 
about the relativity of the parties’ entitlement, both legal and moral. The concept of moral 
title permits the recognition by decision-makers that other factors are involved and that it is 
not a simple question of an object being returned to an original owner.  
Moral title fits in neatly within the English law principle of relativity of title to property (even 
in the absence of any argument that it should have legal effect). Here a moral title comes 
about (without any automatic legal force and therefore without any automatic priority over 
existing legal title). Nevertheless, it is still something that is pitted against, or is enjoyed by 
one party at the same time as the legal title is enjoyed by another. For example, the 
claimant’s moral title may require the legal title holder to display an account of the object’s 
history next to the object whilst it is on display.  
There has clearly been strong support for the return of Nazi Era cultural objects to their pre-
war owners. The Panel has acceded to claims for return in circumstances where the objects 
were seized, or where the original owners did not receive the true market price at the 
forced sale or where they have been uncompensated. In cases where there was clearly a 
strength to the moral claim but the claimant had received compensation or adequate 
consideration at the sale the Panel has recommended that the object remain in the museum 
and that an account of the object’s history be displayed. However, other claimant groups 
have not received as much support. If the Nazi Era claims process and the entitlement 
enjoyed by the claimants can be framed as a tangible concept that can be transposed to the 
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context of resolving other claims for cultural heritage this will facilitate the development of 
principles that can be applied to claims elsewhere but also demonstrate that where the 
moral title is based on objective principles these can justify action in other areas. The 
concepts developed by the Panel and which are given effect to in the concept of moral title 
are more objective than concepts such as ‘rightful owner’ which is found in the media. 
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